Based on an idea by Hin, the method of obtaining the original message after selecting k of n coordinates at random in the McEliece public-key cryptosystem is improved. The attack, which is more efficient than the attacks previously proposed, is characterized by a systematic method of checking and by a random bit swapping procedure. An optimization procedure similar to the one proposed by Lee and Brickell is used to improve the attack. The attack is highly suitable for parallel and pipelined implementation. The work factor and the values, which yield 'maximum' security for the system are given.
Introduction
At Crypto'87 Adams and Meijer 1 1 1 presented a paper in which the 'optimum' values for the parameters of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem [9] are given. As shown in (11 these values improve the cryptanalytic complexity of the system and increase the information rate. As noted in [4, 9] there are several ways of attacking McEliece's cryptosystem. Of the known attacks, the one which requires the least effort is based on decoding a more or less arbitrary linear code containing correctable errors. It has been proved in [2] that the general decoding problem for linear codes is NPcomplete, SO one certainly expects that for sufficiently large code parameters, the minimal effort for this attack will become computationally infeasable. T h e best known attack is based on selecting and solving k of n equations obtained from the (publicly known) encryption matrix and the cryptogram. Thereafter it is necessary to verify whether the obtained solution is unique and gives the correct plaintext.
If the solution is not correct, then a new set of k equations has to be selected etc.
For the attack it was shown in [I.] that for a suitable choice of the parameters this minimal effort can be maximized. This paper gives a n improved method to obtain the original message after selecting k o f n cryptogram bits. A bit swapping procedure is used to randomly renew the set of k-bits one bit a t a time. A fast validation wether the selected k-bits are error-free and the corresponding columns of the publicly known encryption matrix are linearly independent is part of the algorithm. At the same time when this paper was accepted €or presentation at Crypto'88, Lee and Brickell [7] presented an elegant attack on the McEliece public-key cryptosystem at Eurocrypt'88. Their attack is based on a generalization of two well known attacks and includes a systematic method for checking whether the obtained message agrees with the original message and is closely related to our attack.
Sections 2 and 3 describe the public-key cryptosystem and some well known attacks on this system. Section 4 discusses the basics of the proposed attack including the way of validation. The algorithm, based on a bit swapping procedure, is subsequently given in the next section. Section 6 considers in more details the bit swapping procedure. In section 7 the work factor is discussed and in Section 8 an optimization similar to the one proposed by Lee and Brickell is used to improve the attack. Finally we note in Section 9, that the public-key can be reduced to k x (n-k) bits without affecting the security of the system.
McEliece's Cryptosystem
The McEliece public-key cryptosystem can be easily understood from the following description. Let C be a linear [n, Ic, d] code over GF (2) with code length n, dimension k and minimum distance d. Let the k x n matrix G be a generator matrix of C and let the (n-Ic) x n matrix N be a parity check matrix of C. The publicly known encryption matrix E is defined by
where S is a k x k non-singular binary matrix over G F ( 2 ) and P is an n x n permutation matrix. The scheme also uses a subset 2 of GF(2)" with the property that the Hamming weight w H (~) of the vectors 4 E 2 is less or equal than t = (d -1)/2. Generally w H ( z ) = t .
--e = n E + g = c + g, A k-message m is encrypted into the n-bit ciphertext e as follows
(2)
where c is a n-bit permuted codeword from C . This encryption scheme must satisfy the properties introduced by Diffie and Hellman (31 to become a public-key cryptosystem. Therefore the decryption process must be fast if the private-keys S, P and G are known and the decryption process must be infeasible if only the public-key E is known. Furthermore the encryption process must be fast if one has only knowledge of the public-key E . McEliece based his cryptosystem on the existence of Goppa codes, which meet the conditions for a public-key cryptosystem and can easily be generated.
We In this section we will discuss some general and well known attacks on the McEliece scheme. We shall not pay attention to special cases for which fast cryptanalysis exist.
Factoring the encryption matix
Let G, denote the generator matrix G in systematic form and let the encipher matrix E be SG,P. Therefore we may conclude that for sufficiently large parameters it will be infeasible to obtain the private-keys S, G and P by an exhaustive search. Another approach is based on a brute force search for a correct Jyndrome. Let D be the matrix HP. Clearly EDT = 0. Find an error vector g with minimum weight for which eDT = g D T . However, it seems to be necessary to search through all solutions of this equation to find the desired z of minimum weight and has a work factor of about O ( n t ) .
Recover message from cryptogram and encryption matrix
McEliece proposes in [9] to select randomly k of n ciphertext bits from g in the hope that none of the k selected bits are in error, and based on this assumption, to obtain the correct plaintext m. The probability pk of no error in the chosen k-bits of e, however, is equal to
Selecting k-bits, which are not in error, does not guarantee that the corresponding k x k sub-matrix of E is non-singular. This only holds for maximum distance separable codes (MDS, [8]). In case of an MDS code every k columns of the encryption matrix are linearly independent. Since the Goppa codes used in the McEliece scheme are not MDS, we will have k linearly independent columns with a probability q k > 0. This also holds for the encryption matrix E , since S works on the message space and P permutes the code words. Clearly, q k can not be estimated by assuming that E is a random matrix.
The amount of work involved in solving k simultaneous equations in k unkown is k" (e.g. a = 2.8 [S]). Let v k be the average work factor if k columns are linearly dependent. Hence, before finding the message m with this attack one expects a work factor of between 2 and 3, the maximal work-factor (without validation, 7 = 1 and qk = 1) is reached at t = 37. In this case for a = 3 the work-factor is approximately za4.l, while for t = 50 this becomes 280.7. As a consequence of this improvement, the value of k is increased from 524 to 654; i.e. the information rate R= k/n is increased from 0.51 to 0.64.
Main Idea
A straightforward approach is based on a brute force distance search as mentioned in the previous section. Despite the high work factor this approach has the advantage that there are no additional validation costs, because the validation is part of the attack itself. As suggested by Hin [5] , this attack can be improved by taking the constraints imposed by the cryptogram into account. For this reason we have to restate the above attack in terms of the cryptogram e instead of the message m.
For the attack to be described in the next section we need a decomposition of the encryption matrix E in the following form
where I k is the k x k identity matrix and A a is a k x (n -k) binary matrix. Since every linear code is equivalent to a systematic code, this decomposition is always possible.
If we apply a permutation matrix P a to e=mE + z, then we obtain the relation
which will be denoted as e a = c^ + z a .
The function FKB(x) is defined as
Hence, FKB{x) selects the first fc-bits from a n-bit vector x.
We are now able to prove the next theorem. a Observe that this theorem describes McEliece 'attack (with validation) in a more general form. During the initial phase of the attack, k cryptogram bits are randomly selected (without replacement) from e. The k selected bits form the set A and the remaining (n-k)-bits are assigned to set 0. Selecting k new bits in the McEliece attack is replaced by a permutation Pb which swaps at most k new bits from set B for k-bits from set A. The permutation is only succesful if the corresponding columns of the encryption matrix E are linearly independent as has been mentioned in section 3. The theorem states that the obtained solution is unique and gives the correct message n if the distance verification is positive. In the next section we will describe an attack based on this kind of bit swapping.
One Bit Swapping Attack
The McEliece attack can be considered as a k-bit swapping attack. To obtain a low complexity and to determine in a fast way if a given permutation fulfils, we will present an algorithm for a one bit swapping procedure only.
The algorithm for a one bit swapping attack consists of the following 5 steps.
Step 1 -initialisation. Step 2 -checking. Step 3 -swapping.
Check if it holds that ~H ( F K B (~, , ) [ I~) A , ] , G )
The algorithm P R P produces a pseudo-random permutation P b . 
Number of Swaps
A ciphertext e is obtained by adding an error vector z with Hamming weight t to a permuted codeword c = m E . Therefore there are t 'disturbed' bits in the cryptogram e which differ from the permuted codeword bits in c. In the attack bits are repeatedly swapped in order to obtain k non-disturbed ciphertext bits. During the initial phase of the attack, k cryptogram bits are randomly selected (without replacement) from g. The k selected bits form the set A = {e,} and the remaining (n-k)-bits are assigned to set B = {e,,}. The procedure swap(e,,e,), which swaps a bit from set A for a bit from set B, has one of the following values 0 s = 0 if a (non-)disturbed bit e, is swapped €or a (non-)disturbed bit e,,, 0 8 = -1 if a disturbed bit e, is swapped for a non-disturbed bit e,, 0 s = +1 if non-disturbed bit e, is swapped for a disturbed bit e,.
For the conditional probability Pr{i + sli}, i.e. the probability that an event with i disturbed bits e, in A is followed after a swap by an event with i + s disturbed bits e, in A, we find The average number of random swaps (with replacement) N(n,k,t) depending on all the possible ( n t ) initial states is given by
Work factor
Let Wi denotes the average work factor of step i. With a probability of approximately one half (Qk zz f ) a permutation P b is found in step 3 which can be used. The For W2 we find that
On average W-2 will be 2 ( t + l ) . M ( k ) .
(14)
For W4 we obtain On average W4 will be -. A(n-k -1).
In general the work factor (11) becomes N ( n , k , t ) .
If we use for example the average values (14) and (17) in (11), then we obtain the following work factor
This way we find for the overall average work factor (without parallelism etc.)
The maximum value of W is approximately 276.8 for t = 39. The average number of swaps is in this case 259.4.
F'urther Improvements
At Eurocrypt'88, Lee and Brickell [7] presented a generalized attack on the McEliece scheme. Briefly, the attack is as follows: a set of k-bits is selected at random from the cryptogram. The set is tested by an exhaustive search for an error pattern with no more than j errors. In case an error pattern is found with j or less errors, the algorithm stops, otherwise a new set of k-bits is selected. For j = 0 the traditional attack is obtained and a brute force distance search for j = t . Lee and Brickell have found (with some assumptions) that the optimum j which minimizes the maximum work factor is 2 for all values of useful code parameters.
Search for one correctable error
Lee and Brickell propose in [7] a random update of only one bit instead of all the kbits at the same time. This bit swapping is actually one of the basics of our method.
From section 6 it follows that the last steps, i.e. removing the last j errors, dominate the work factor. An optimization procedure similar to the Lee-Brickell method is used to speed-up our attack. While in our case there is a trade-off between the swap-complexity and the complexity of the exhaustive search with checking, the optimum j which minimizes the maximum work factor is found to be 1. This low optimumis due to the low complexity of the swap-procedure, which is U(k x ( n -k ) ) .
For a single error pattern search a new step has to be added to the attack described in section 5. If gi is the i-th unit vector, then the new step becomes
Step 2a -~e a r c h for one correctable error The maximum overall work factor W is approximately 2".' for t = 39. The average number of swaps is in this case 253.4.
Partial search for two correctable errors
Since the value of W,, is small compared to (Wz + Wi), a partial search for patterns with two errors can be considered additionally. The number of partial search patterns used in step 2b below is denoted by n,.
Step 2b -partiaZ search for two correctable errors For the average work factor W 2 6 for step 2b we find that
If we assume a uniform distribution of the error patterns, then the probability of succes follows from
The average work factor N; for states 3 to t follows from equation 9. The average work factor Nz for state i = 2 becomes
The maximum overall work factor W is approximately 269.7 for t = 39 and n, = 5769. The average number of swaps is in this case 250.3.
General Attack
Let f'b be a permutation matrix which swaps at most i-columns from the I k part for i-columns in the A, part of the [IkIA,] matrix. Let S be a subset of GF (2) 0 The receiver determines the error pattern 1, removes it from g, computes w = F K B ( e -c) and calculates the message f~l = as*-' or m = f -' (~, z ) .
It follows that the public-key can be reduced to n x (n-k)-bits. For n = 1024 and t = 39 the reduced key becomes 399 kbits.
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